

# **The Standing Joint Force Headquarters: A Planning Multiplier?**

**A Monograph  
by  
Major Craig A Barkley  
US Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MAJ Craig A Barkley

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Approved by:

---

Timothy D. Parks, COL, IN

Monograph Director

---

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

---

Robert K. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,  
Graduate Degree Programs

## **Abstract**

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters: A Planning Multiplier? by MAJOR Craig A Barkley, US Army, 57 pages.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides a planning multiplier by bringing both joint and regional expertise to the Joint Task Force Headquarters increasing its capabilities. These capabilities assist in the rapid establishment of a fully functional Joint Task Force Headquarters allowing for quicker reaction and crisis action planning. Still the Standing Joint Force Headquarters must overcome certain inherent vulnerabilities that may inhibit the successful integration of the two headquarters elements in becoming a cohesive planning headquarters.

This monograph described the historical events and policy that led to the requirement by the Secretary of Defense for each Regional Combatant Command to establish a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It examined the model presented by Joint Forces Command for the organization and responsibilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Along with its structure examined the methods of employment the Standing Joint Force Headquarters could use to respond to crises throughout the world. It focused this paper on the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters into an existing headquarters, the Army Operational Headquarters. In addition, it outlined the organizational structure of the newly transformed Army Operational Headquarters. It discussed differences between the Standing Joint Force Headquarters at different Regional Combatant Commands. This led to an analysis of the capabilities the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings to the Joint Task Force Headquarters in support of the Army Operational Headquarters. Therefore, it concluded that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters contains capabilities that are beneficial to the establishment of a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The joint and regional expertise brought by the Standing Joint Force Headquarters allows for a more rapid establishment of a cohesive and functioning Joint Task Force Headquarters.

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## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

The first Standing Joint Force Headquarters, established in 2004, has deployed throughout the world in support of our National Security Policy in operations in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Pakistani earthquake, and even domestically in support of Hurricane Katrina.<sup>1</sup>

Although the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is not organic to the Army's new operational headquarters, it provides the Joint Task Force Commander with a planning multiplier by bringing additional capabilities and providing the necessary joint foundation that allows for the rapid establishment of the Joint Task Force Headquarters. These capabilities provide the headquarters with increased understanding of the joint environment and allow the headquarters to begin crisis action planning sooner. Still it must overcome certain inherent vulnerabilities that may inhibit the successful integration of the Army Operational Headquarters and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters in becoming a cohesive planning headquarters.

This paper analyzes how the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the Army Operational Headquarters integrates to create a cohesive Joint Task Force Headquarters. In order to provide the reader with the necessary background information, this paper begins with a historical overview of the development of the concept of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and describes the events and policy that led to the requirement for the Regional Combatant Commands to establish this standing headquarters by 2005. It then explores the organizational structures of both the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the new Army Operational Headquarters to familiarize the reader with the structure of each organization. The paper describes the three standard employment options for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters focusing on the option concerning the integration of the headquarters into an existing operational headquarters. A description of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters established at several of the

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington, D.C., 2006), 60.

Regional Combatant Commands reveals differences in the design and structure. The models are compared to determine the similarities and differences between the commands and the JFCOM prototype. The paper then analyzes the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the current Standing Joint Force Headquarters when integrated with the newly transformed Army Operational Headquarters to provide a planning multiplier to the Joint Task Force Headquarters. The final chapter recommends ways to ensure the capabilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters complement the Army Operational Headquarters while reducing the inherent vulnerabilities it contains.

The formulation of working definitions for capability and vulnerability must be established in order to conduct a useful analysis. Joint Publication 1-02 defines a capability as the ability to execute a specified course of action.<sup>2</sup> This definition is limited and requires expansion if we are to conduct an analysis of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The final draft of the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 3010.02B, defines a capability as the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.<sup>3</sup> This definition of capability provides us with the understanding that a capability is the ways and means available to achieve the desired effect in a given situation. Applying this definition to our analysis, a capability is defined as the ways and means, to include the personnel and organizational structure, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides as a planning multiplier to the Army Operational Headquarters when establishing a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

In contrast, Joint Doctrine defines vulnerability as the characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation, the incapability to perform the designated mission, as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001, 2005), 76

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, Joint Operations Concepts Development Process*, Final Draft, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), GL-3.



environment.<sup>4</sup> In our analysis, a vulnerability is defined using the first part of the Joint definition. Therefore, a vulnerability is a characteristic of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters that may impede or degrade its ability to provide a planning multiplier when integrated with the Army Operational Headquarters. With these working definitions of capability and vulnerability, the capabilities that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters bring to the Joint Task Force Headquarters can be analyzed to determine how these capabilities will provide planning multipliers to the Army Operational Headquarters. The question remains, what in the contemporary operating environment has led to the need or requirement for creating a Standing Joint Force Headquarters?

The world has evolved into an environment filled with both state and non-state actors that can jeopardize our nation's security. The National Defense Strategy identified four types of adversarial capabilities that may threaten our nation's interests.<sup>5</sup> It is imperative that the nation and the military understand and plan for these threats in order to provide for the nation's security in this ever-changing environment. The four types of capabilities identified include traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods.<sup>6</sup> The first method involves the use of traditional capabilities through the employment of conventional military forces, usually associated with state actors, to influence the conditions in their region.<sup>7</sup> However, states are no longer the only potential adversary encountered and this requires the nation to prepare for the second challenge produced from irregular methods. Examples of irregular methods include the use of terrorism and insurgency that focus on eroding U.S. influence and political will.<sup>8</sup> The third challenge is the use of catastrophic methods. This method involves the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its friends and allies.<sup>9</sup> The fourth

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001, 2005), 571.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy*, (Washington, D.C., 2005), 2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

challenge the nation faces in the national security environment is the use of disruptive methods. This method includes technological advances that degrade or negate our current advantages include, but not limited to, directed-energy weapons and cyber operations.<sup>10</sup> Adversaries can use one or a combination of these methods to threaten the nation's security.

Therefore, the military must understand, not just the military element, but also the diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects of the environment as well. The accomplishment of the military's missions is dependent on an understanding of the complexity involved when both internal and external factors can affect the intended outcome, or effect, that the military attempts to achieve. The contemporary operating environment is a complex environment made up of multiple interconnected systems, which can influence each other in sometimes unpredictable ways. Therefore, the contemporary operating environment is defined as a complex adaptive system. A way to begin understanding these systems is through the allocation of dedicated staffs that focus on identifying and predicting the second and third order effects of the adversaries' actions and inactions. A possible answer to developing an understanding and awareness of the current environment may be what Robert Axelrod termed as "harnessing complexity."<sup>11</sup> He describes this process as a deliberate changing of the structure of the system to increase our desired outcome, or measure of performance, by exploiting the understanding that the system is complex.<sup>12</sup> For this reason, the military should take advantage of the complexity of the system instead of ignoring it or trying to eliminate it.<sup>13</sup>

The complexity of the environment has lead to the increased interdependence of the military services and the interagency in an effort to provide for the nation's security in a cohesive and unified effort. The question is how do we determine and understand the factors and systems

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 9.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

we are facing currently in Iraq and those of the future. More important, how does the United States military obtain this knowledge and organize it to respond to a crisis?

The Joint Task Force is the military's standard response to a response to a crisis. It provides commanders with a flexible force with service capabilities that can produce rapid, precise, and decisive operations with the smallest footprint possible.<sup>14</sup> However, the establishment of command and control of joint forces in a crisis is not a simple task. In the past, the formation of the Joint Task Force Headquarters was more like a pick up team than a cohesive headquarters organization. The Task Force Commander and staff populated a Joint Manning Document with personnel from various units and locations to fill positions the staff identified as mission essential. These individuals may have been selected entirely on their rank and not their individual knowledge or specialty in the region or the type of operation the mission entailed. In other words, many Joint Task Force Headquarters were "ad hoc" organizations that required considerable time to become effective cohesive units. There was a need to provide the Joint Task Force Commander a cohesive element that during peacetime could focus on regional and mission specific training. For this reason, Joint Forces Command offered the concept of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

A definition of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is essential to understanding how this element can integrate with the new Army Headquarters. Joint Forces Command defines the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as the following:

A full-time joint command and control element that is part of the combatant commander's staff. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters focuses on deliberate and crisis action planning and is a fully integrated participant in the combatant command staff's planning and operations activities. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters exploits new organizational and operational concepts and technology to enhance the command's peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the

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<sup>14</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element*, (Norfolk, VA, 2004), i.

efficient formation of a Joint Task Force Headquarters, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force.<sup>15</sup>

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters' Standard Operating Procedure produced by Joint Forces Command provides a more comprehensive definition of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It describes the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as a full-time element providing joint command and control within the Combatant Command staff with a focus on warfighting and integrated with the Combatant Commander's staff for planning and operations.<sup>16</sup> It continues by stating that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters supplies the Combatant Commander with a trained joint command and control capability organized to enhance situational awareness and understanding to respond to crisis situations.<sup>17</sup> By utilizing available technologies and techniques, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters conducts a holistic analysis in order to gain situational understanding.<sup>18</sup> Using this understanding of the vulnerabilities, the application of the elements of power is used to deter or contain the crisis situation.<sup>19</sup>

Provided the definition above, the next step to understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is to establish its mission. The Transformation Planning Guidance of 2003 defines the Standing Joint Force Headquarters mission as the following:

Standing joint force headquarters will conduct effects-based, adaptive planning in response to contingencies, with the objective of defeating enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations.<sup>20</sup>

The goal of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is to improve response time in standing up an effective Joint Task Force Headquarters. The Standing Joint Forces Headquarters is a key element in the Department of Defense's transformation efforts to strengthen our

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Revision Second Draft*, (Washington, D.C., 2005), GL-29.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element*, (Norfolk, VA, 2004), iii.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Department of Defense. *Transformation Planning Guidance*, (Washington, D.C., 2003), 10.

capability to conduct joint operations.<sup>21</sup> Inherent in its design, it provides a focus on system of systems analysis and provides the commander with an operational net assessment that will enable a coherent effects-based approach to the planning process.

During this same time, the Army was going through its own transformation of units and headquarters. The current command and control headquarters remain Army-centric and require transformation and adaptation to become an effective joint headquarters. The Army headquarters needed this enhanced capability to command and control joint forces.

The Army focused its efforts on creating a modular force that could “plug and play” to meet the requirements of the combatant commander. In the process, the Army attempted to eliminate one of the echelons of headquarters to create a more streamlined command and control. This led to the concept terms of the UE<sub>x</sub> and UE<sub>y</sub>, units of employment, to focus the developers on the functions and responsibilities of the new headquarters and not on the established functions of the historical units. This allowed the developers to focus on what each headquarters required without the biases associated with the historical naming conventions. In the end, the Army culture and heraldry won out and the decision to retain the designation of Division, Corps, and Army remain in the lexicon.

Although the names remain the same, the transformation of the U.S. Army’s Division, Corps, and Army Headquarters requirements and capabilities have changed to meet the needs of the new environment of “Jointness.” The design provided it with the capability to function as a Joint Forces Land Component Command or as a Joint Task Force Headquarters when augmented with additional resources. Therefore, the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the Army’s transformed operational headquarters is critical to the formation of a cohesive Joint Task Force Headquarters that is capable of operating throughout the full spectrum of operations and conduct effective crisis action planning. Nevertheless, how does the Standing

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<sup>21</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), i.

Joint Force Headquarters integrate with these new Army Operational Headquarters? Is there an easy fit or will it cause the same issues as the “ad hoc” organization of the past? These issues are discussed later in this paper. The capabilities provided by the Standing Joint Force Headquarters are beneficial to the establishment of the Joint Task Force Headquarters and provide planning multipliers to the Joint Task Force Headquarters, but must still overcome certain inherent vulnerabilities that may degrade the successful integration of the headquarters to become a cohesive planning headquarters.

## CHAPTER TWO

### WHAT LED TO THE SJFHQ CONCEPT

To understand the significance of the concept of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, it is important to examine the historical context that led to its' establishment. The belief that the United States military will always operate as a member of the joint team led to the requirement that the joint headquarters needed to be free, to the greatest extent possible, of the service parochialism of the past. Nevertheless, the question remained, how were members of the different services to work together without looking out for only their service's interests. The answer was a combination of legislation and a change in service culture.

Although sometimes given the credit, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was not the beginning of the concept of "Jointness," but was an effort to revitalize the concept that began with the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 combined the War Department and Navy Department, created the Department of the Air Force, and placed the three branches in the Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense.<sup>22</sup> This provided the nation with a unified command structure for the military in an effort to move the services toward joint operations.

In 1958, in an effort to expand on the idea of "Jointness," President Eisenhower proclaimed:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements in all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of service.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Department of State. *National Security Act of 1947*.  
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17603.htm>, 6 February 2006.

<sup>23</sup> James R. Helmly, "Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need For a Standing Joint Task Force" (Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1991), 9.

His statement displayed an understanding that the U.S. Military needed both unity of effort and unity of command in order to be the most efficient and effective in future operations. The synergistic effect of the services working together was the key to military and national success.

Instability in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters in 1980. In an effort to increase the quality of joint planning and training, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was the first Joint Task Force Headquarters stood up during peacetime designed to integrate the services toward centralizing the planning for non-NATO contingencies in Southwest Asia.<sup>24</sup> Although its primary focus was on the Persian Gulf, its design allowed it to respond to crises around the globe. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force eventually evolved into what is now Central Command. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force remained a lost idea until the designation of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

In 1980, Desert One, the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran, caused concern about the ability of the services to operate jointly. The major concerns found by the Holloway Commission were the “ad hoc” nature of the organization, unclear chain of command, and operations security was excessive.<sup>25</sup> The Commission expounded on the “ad hoc” nature of the operation stating:

An existing Joint Task Force organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have provided an organizational framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.<sup>26</sup>

This sounds similar to the concept of creating a Standing Joint Force Headquarters and may provide some of the foundation for the implementation of the concept.

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<sup>24</sup> Paul K. Davis, *Observations on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission*. (Rand Corporation, 1982), 3.

<sup>25</sup> Otto Kreisher, “Desert One,” *Air Force Magazine Online*, January 1999, Vol. 82, No. 1. <http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan1999/>, 8 February 2006.

<sup>26</sup> James R. Helmly, “Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need For a Standing Joint Task Force” (Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1991), 19.



Then, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 moved the services toward an even greater “Jointness.” The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the most comprehensive reorganizations of the military since the National Security Act of 1947.<sup>27</sup> The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, became the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, it established a clear chain of command from the Unified Commanders, or Combatant Commanders, to the Secretary of Defense to the President. This bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries reducing the service parochialism identified in the past. It put greater power in the hands of the Combatant Commanders to operate as Joint Commanders versus Service Commanders.

Then in 2000, Joint Forces Command published a white paper on Adaptive Joint Command and Control. The basis of this concept involved organizing the Joint Task Force Headquarters to take advantage of information superiority and other technologies to create command and control that is more efficient, reduce the headquarters forward deployed, and improve the decision cycle.<sup>28</sup> One of the initiatives presented in the white paper was the concept of a “Standing Core Joint Force Headquarters.”<sup>29</sup> The concept was an organization staffed in peacetime that could focus on planning for future contingencies, training for those contingencies, and be able to operate as part of the headquarters during the contingency.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the Adaptive Joint Command and Control whitepaper recommended establishing a small, full-time staff dedicated to planning and training for any future contingency and could be employed to provide rapid response to crisis situations.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 1.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2)*, (Norfolk, VA, 2000), 1-2.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, iv.

<sup>30</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 2.

<sup>31</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2)*, (Norfolk, VA, 2000), 2-2.

In May 2001, Unified Vision 01, a concept refinement experiment conducted by the Joint Experimentation Directorate at Joint Forces Command, provided supporting data that a standing command and control element could reduce the ad hoc nature of forming a Joint Task Force.<sup>32</sup>

This led to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's statement in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report that the Department of Defense would develop a prototype Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters with the goal of establishing one in each of the regional combatant commands.<sup>33</sup>

Because of this directive, Joint Forces Command began refining the concept and developed a prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters to participate in Millennium Challenge 2002.<sup>34</sup> Millennium Challenge was a congressionally mandated, operational level, joint experiment that combined live forces with simulation.<sup>35</sup> The scenario was a small-scale contingency with the potential to escalate into major combat operations.

Due to real world mission requirements, the original headquarters designated for Millennium Challenge 2002 did not participate in the exercise requiring a last minute replacement that provided a more realistic assignment of Joint Task Force Headquarters for the experiment.<sup>36</sup> During Millennium Challenge 2002, the Joint Forces Command's Standing Joint Force Headquarters prototype integrated into the Joint Task Force Headquarters, which happened to be U.S. Army III Corps.<sup>37</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provided III Corps, the Joint Task Force Headquarters, with "value-added" command and control support, reduced the ad hoc nature of activating the Joint Task Force, reduced the learning curve, and facilitated continuity in

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<sup>32</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 2.

<sup>33</sup> Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 33-34.

<sup>34</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 2.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Douglas Zimmerman. "Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters," *Military Review*, July-August 2004, 28.

<sup>37</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 3.

planning and operations throughout the experimental mission.<sup>38</sup> A direct result of Millennium Challenge 2002 was direction from the Secretary of Defense to implement the Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept.<sup>39</sup>

Then in May 2002, the Fiscal Year 04-09 Defense Planning Guidance directed the Department of Defense to strengthen joint operations through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint training transformation, and an expanded joint forces presence policy.<sup>40</sup> It then placed a deadline for the creation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters within each Regional Combatant Command by Fiscal Year 2005. It stated:

The Regional Combatant Commanders will establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters by FY2005 reflecting standards established by Joint Forces Command and incorporating lessons learned in Millennium Challenge '02.<sup>41</sup>

This requirement from the Secretary of Defense propelled the rapid development and organization of Standing Joint Force Headquarters in each of the Regional Combatant Commands.

Although the concept of joint planning and command and control was not a new idea, the National Security Act of 1947 started the military on a course toward “Jointness” that was revitalized by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. Joint Forces Command’s experimentation with the concept of a standing headquarters that could form the core element of a Joint Task Force led to the establishment of Standing Joint Force Headquarters in each of the Regional Combatant Commands.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Douglas Zimmerman. “Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters,” *Military Review*, July-August 2004, 28.

<sup>40</sup> Department of Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance, FY2004-2009*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), 15.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER THREE

# ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SJFHQ

Before an analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is conducted, a description of its standard task organization and its primary mission tasks is required. This will assist in understanding how this element will integrate with other headquarters to form a cohesive Joint Task Force Headquarters and provide a planning multiplier to the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters conducts five primary tasks during normal operations. The tasks include the following:<sup>42</sup>

- Maintain Day-to-Day Situational Understanding
- Conduct and participate in training and exercises
- Fully leverage Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) to enhance C2 capabilities
- Build and maintain Operational Net Assessment (ONA) products
- Effects Based Operations and Planning (EBO/EBP)

The first two tasks are self-explanatory, but an understanding of the collaborative information environment, operational net assessment, and effects based planning need explanation to understand the scope of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters planning processes.

First, the definition of the collaborative information environment is a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations and enable a commander to make decisions better and faster than the adversary.<sup>43</sup> It provides shared situational awareness and understanding of the adversary, friendly, and battlespace to decision

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<sup>42</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), iv.

<sup>43</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 5. Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 5.

makers at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels utilizing a web portal that integrates information and knowledge into a “virtual warehouse” that can be tailored to their needs.<sup>44</sup>

The second task is building and maintaining the operational net assessment. The definition of operational net assessment is an operational support tool that provides effect-to-task linkages based on system of systems analysis of a potential adversary’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) capabilities and vulnerabilities.<sup>45</sup> It is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves, friends, and allies.<sup>46</sup>

The next task is conducting effects based operations and planning. It is defined as operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.<sup>47</sup> In other words, effects-based planning integrates diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements to create the desired condition to meet the national objective.<sup>48</sup> However, it is important to remember, an effect describes the potential or intended condition of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational systems not the immediate target effects at the tactical level.<sup>49</sup> Effects-based operations are both interdependent and enabled by the products of the operational net assessment and the collaborative information environment as displayed in Figure 1.

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<sup>44</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), H-1.


<sup>45</sup> Ibid., H-2-H-3.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 4. Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2004), 8.

<sup>47</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element*, (Norfolk, VA, 2004), H-2.

<sup>48</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7. Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2004), 11.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 2.



**Figure 1. Major Components of Effects-Based Operations<sup>50</sup>**

In order to accomplish the five primary tasks, the standard Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters comprises a 58 personnel staff along with a 6-person System of Systems Approach cell.<sup>51</sup> Six functionally aligned administrative groups make up the Standing Joint Force Headquarters: Command, Plans, Operations, Information Superiority, Knowledge Management, and Logistics. These groups maintain the day-to-day administrative responsibility and accountability for the functional areas and provide support to the four cross-functional teams.<sup>52</sup> The four cross-functional teams include the Plans, Operations, Information Superiority, and Knowledge Management Teams. The Command Group integrates the four cross-functional teams to meet the Commander's intent. Logistics Group personnel with their expertise integrate into both the Plans and Operations cross-functional teams. See Figure 2.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7. Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2004), 8.

<sup>51</sup> Douglas Zimmerman. "Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters," *Military Review*, July-August 2004, 32.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

The Command Group leader is a Flag or General Officer, titled Director, and is responsible for the command and control and leadership functions of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the five functional groups.<sup>53</sup> The Command Group supports the Combatant Commander by ensuring the integration, synchronization, and unity of effort of the cross-functional teams in support of pre-crisis planning, crisis action planning, and future s planning through development of the operational net assessment for the Combatant Commander's requirements in the Area of Responsibility.<sup>54</sup>





Figure 2. Cross-Functional Teams.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element*, (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 1-1.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 8.

The Planning Group is the primary interface with the Combatant Commander's planning process.<sup>56</sup> The group is task organized as seen in the left column of Figure 3. Ground planners, both Army and Marine, an air planner, a maritime planner, and a planner from the special operations community provide the expertise and input from each of the services during the planning process. The Plans Group includes specialty planners with expertise in space, operational law, political-military, force protection, and deployment providing plans that are more comprehensive. Additionally, the Blue/Red Planners afford the commander a view of the adversary's, along with a regional, perspective of the environment assisting in identifying critical nodes and linkages that will aid in achieving the objectives and produce the intended effect.<sup>57</sup>



**Figure 3. Plans Group and Plans Team Organizational Structure.**<sup>58</sup>

The Planning Team is task organized according to the crisis situation. In addition to the members of the Planning Group, a list of possible examples of cross-functional team members is

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.


<sup>57</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element*, (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 5-2.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.



in the right column of Figure 3. The team provides background insight during the deliberate planning with the J5, Plans, and crisis action planning with the J3, Operations.<sup>59</sup> This team is comprised of members with joint expertise, situational understanding, an understanding of the commander's intent, and experience in Effects Based Planning.<sup>60</sup>

The Operations Group monitors the on-going missions and actions utilizing the collaborative information environment and by other means to ensure the integration and synchronization of current operations.<sup>61</sup> As seen on the left column of Figure 4, the Operations Group is comprised up of land, air, maritime, special operations, and a fires and targeting officers.



**Figure 4. Operations Group and Operations Team Organizational Structure.<sup>62</sup>**

The Operations Team is primarily responsible for gaining and maintaining current situational awareness and situational understanding, aiding in the operational net assessment development and update, and monitoring the achievement of effects using measures of

<sup>59</sup> Ibid

<sup>60</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 8.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 3-2.

effectiveness and operating in the joint operations center.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, the Operations Team tracks the readiness of friendly forces and monitors the requirements for sustainment to support the operation.<sup>64</sup> The team's design attempts to eliminate the information stovepipes of functional organizations and allow for managed flow of information and knowledge throughout the organization in support the informed decision-making and integration within a broader operational context to include all elements of national power.<sup>65</sup> The Operations Team is comprised of the Operations Group members plus additional members from the other groups to produce the cross-functional team.

The Information Superiority Group has four sections focusing in the functional areas of Operational Net Assessment, Intelligence, Information Operations, and Effects Assessment.<sup>66</sup> The Information Superiority Group provides members to participate in the cross-functional teams to provide input in issues of information superiority.<sup>67</sup>

The Information Superiority Team coordinates and synchronizes Standing Joint Force Headquarters activities utilizing the collaborative information environment with focus in operational net assessment, Joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and assessment of effects.<sup>68</sup> The team attempts to achieve and maintain information superiority through its assessment of the information environment and defining the necessary objectives for these activities.<sup>69</sup> The goal is to gather and exploit information about the adversary without allowing

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<sup>63</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 9.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 3-1.


<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 2-1.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 9.

<sup>69</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 2-1.

the adversary to gain information on us.<sup>70</sup> Figure 5 displays the Information Superiority Group's organizational structure.



**Figure 5. Information Superiority Group Organization.<sup>71</sup>**

The Information Superiority Team is composed of members from the Plans, Operations, and Knowledge Management Groups, focuses on operational net assessment development, effects assessment, and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance planning.<sup>72</sup>

The Knowledge Management Team provides the management and coordination of both knowledge management operations and information technology relating to the collaborative information environment.<sup>73</sup> It ensures information is available to the user and displayed in a format that is understandable and actionable.<sup>74</sup> Knowledge management attempts to harness information technology through standardized collaborative policies and procedures to develop

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.


<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 6-2.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 6-1.

databases, information, and knowledge to obtain decision superiority.<sup>75</sup> As seen in Figure 6, The Knowledge Management Team provides Knowledge Management Officers to other teams to assist in their knowledge management activities in their respective areas.




**Figure 6. Knowledge Management Group Organization.<sup>76</sup>**

As part of a Joint Task Force, four areas of expertise make up the Knowledge Management Group. As discussed above, the first subdivision is to assist the other teams with their knowledge management requirements. The other areas include the Global Command and Control operators and the managers of the common operational picture, knowledge request managers, and the Director of Communications. Through the collaborative information environment, all of these together provide the end user with the knowledge they need for

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 6-2.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 6-1.

informed decision-making. As an example, Figure 7 displays a notional task organization of a Knowledge Management Team assigned to a Joint Task Force.




**Figure 7. Knowledge Management Team Organization in a Joint Task Force.<sup>77</sup>**

The Logistics Group performs the integration, coordination, and implementation of logistics functions, both planning and operational, within the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.<sup>78</sup> Although the logistics function does not have a dedicated cross-functional team of its own, logistic personnel and expertise integrate into both the Operations Team and the Planning Team.<sup>79</sup> Figure 8 depicts the task organization of the Logistics Operations Group. The Logistics Operations section focuses on maintaining the Logistics common operating picture and logistics-related situational awareness and understanding.<sup>80</sup> The Logistics Plans Section determines strategic mobility and logistics support requirements, prepares supportability estimates and transportation feasibility assessments for both deliberate and crisis action

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

planning.<sup>81</sup> Logisticians develop a detailed understanding of the logistical infrastructure in the region and develop options for common-user logistics.<sup>82</sup>



**Figure 8. Logistics Group Organization.<sup>83</sup>**

The Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters is task organized to achieve its primary tasks of maintaining situational understanding, conducting and participating in training and exercises, utilizing the Collaborative Information Environment to enhance command and control, producing operational net assessment products, and conducting effects based operations and planning. The five administrative groups maintain day-to-day operations during peacetime and

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 4-1.

<sup>79</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 9.

<sup>80</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 4-6.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 9.

<sup>83</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 4-1.

the four cross-functional teams provide the Regional Combatant Commander with the joint expertise needed during crisis situations. Through these specialized tasks and responsibilities, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides a planning multiplier to the Combatant Commander or to the Army Operational Headquarters.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS OF THE SJFHQ

To analyze how the Standing Joint Force Headquarters integrates with the Army Operational Headquarters it is important to understand the how the Regional Combatant Commander normally employs the element. Although the focus of this paper is the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters with an existing headquarters element, a discussion of the standard employment methods provides an awareness of the options available to the Regional Combatant Commander. This allows the reader to analyze how the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings its capabilities to the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

The Joint Forces Command prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters has three primary employment options during a crisis or contingency. The combatant commander selects which employment option is best based on three operational factors. The scope of the contingency is one operational factor the Combatant Commander bases his selection for employment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.<sup>84</sup> Examples of scope include the complexity of the contingency and the likeliness of escalation. The second factor considered is the scale of the potential contingency response forces.<sup>85</sup> In other words, the number of units deployed to the crisis and the required span of control for the headquarters. The expected duration of the operation is the third operational factor, which the Combatant Commander considers when determining the necessary employment option.<sup>86</sup> This factor considers the length of the deployment and the headquarters capability to operate for an extended period in that capacity. Therefore, the Combatant Commander must consider these operational factors when he is determining the best employment option for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 3-17.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.



A brief examination of the of each of the three primary employment options will provide a better understanding of the option's capabilities and will assist in determining which option is preferred in various contingency operations.

The first employment option available to the Regional Combatant Commander involves utilizing the standing joint force headquarters as a forward operational Joint Task Force Command element.<sup>87</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters can provide the core element, or nucleus of the Joint Task Force, but requires significant augmentation, mission specific plugs, and liaisons to be fully functional and perform effectively as a Joint Task Force Headquarters.<sup>88</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters' Director or another Flag or General Officer is designated by the Combatant Commander will lead the joint task force as the Joint Task Force Commander.<sup>89</sup> This option meets the capabilities the Joint Task Force requires in small-scale contingencies and military operations other than war.

A second option for employment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is retention of the element at the Regional Combatant Command Headquarters. In this option, the Regional Combatant Command forms a war fighting headquarters for major combat operations and command and controls operations through subordinate Joint Task Forces, functional commands, and Service Components.<sup>90</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides the Regional Combatant Command with an increased capability for reach-back and coordination allowing for a smaller footprint and forward deployed force headquarters.<sup>91</sup>

The final option for employment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is as an augmentation element to a service component headquarters. This option requires the integration

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 10.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters element into an already existing operational




Figure 9. Standing Joint Force Headquarters Employment Options.<sup>92</sup>

headquarters. This employment option is the primary focus of this paper and is necessary for the establishment of a cohesive and effective Joint Task Force headquarters. As discussed earlier, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (core element) integrated with the III Corps Headquarters during Millennium Challenge 2002. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provided command and control support, aided in activating the Joint Task Force by reducing the learning curve, and facilitated continuity in planning and operations throughout the exercise.<sup>93</sup> This example demonstrates the beneficial capability of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to assist in the rapid response and transition of the service component headquarters, in this case III Corps, to a

<sup>92</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element* (Norfolk, VA, 2004), 3-18.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

fully functional operational Joint Task Force Headquarters. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides the Joint Task Force Headquarters with the required continuity and situational understanding to facilitate a smooth transition to the joint environment.<sup>94</sup> Through the utilization of peacetime planning efforts and the collaborative information environment, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters assists the Joint Task Force Headquarters in its formation, deployment, and employment.<sup>95</sup>

Therefore, the design of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters allows the employment and integration with other headquarters, to include the Army Operational Headquarters. Through its design, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters allows the easy integration with the supported headquarters providing the Joint Task Force Headquarters with a planning multiplier.

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 11.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ARMY HEADQUARTERS

It is important to describe the structure and capabilities of the transformed Army Operational Headquarters in order to evaluate the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to create a functioning Joint Task Force Headquarters. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters can augment an existing headquarters. An understanding of the Army Operational Headquarters is necessary to analyze what capabilities are found in the headquarters and what capabilities the Standing Joint Force Headquarters can provide to the Joint Task Force.

The Army has begun the process of transforming its higher tactical and operational headquarters to meet the future and present needs of the Army. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance stated that Modularity has several advantages to include the creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, the Army is fielding tactical, operational, and theater headquarters with the capability to operate as a land force, component command, joint, and multinational headquarters.<sup>97</sup> The new headquarters provides the flexibility and capability to integrate a Standing Joint Force Headquarters element into its staff in order to create an effective Joint Task Force Headquarters.

One of the goals of the Modular Force was to transform the current headquarters structures with enhanced capabilities to alleviate the redundant levels of headquarters and force structure previously found in the organization.<sup>98</sup> During the developmental stages and in an attempt to focus on the functions and capabilities of the headquarters and not their current


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<sup>96</sup> Department of the Army, *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005* (Washington, D.C.), 9.

<sup>97</sup> Department of the Army, "Army Modular Force Concept Summary. Version 6," Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005), 2.

<sup>98</sup> Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, *A Modular Force for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, National Security Report, Torch Bearer Issue (Arlington, VA, 2005), 13.

function, these new headquarters were initially assigned temporary designations as Units of Employment and designated as  $UE_x$  and  $UE_y$ .<sup>99</sup> The  $UE_x$  was the senior tactical headquarters with the primary function of warfighting and the  $UE_y$  is the Army Service Component Command that has administrative control over Army forces along with providing support for other forces in the theater.<sup>100</sup> Figure 10 demonstrates the conversion of the current headquarters organization structure to the transformed headquarters structure.



**Figure 10. Transformation of Army Headquarters.**<sup>101</sup>

Although the function and capability of the new headquarters is substantially different, the Army, in the end, decided to retain the current use of the terms Division, Corps, and Army in designating the  $UE_x$  and  $UE_y$ . The new operational headquarters design provided it with the flexibility and capability to operate as Joint Force Land Component Command or Joint Task

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 51.

Force with joint manning augmentation.<sup>102</sup> This should allow the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to integrate into the new headquarters utilizing the employment option discussed in the last chapter with relative ease.

During evaluation of the concept, Task Force Modularity provided insight into the possible need for an intermediate headquarters, possibly a 3-star headquarters, to ease the span of control due to the complexity of the operation or for political considerations.<sup>103</sup> However, in March 2005, the decision was made to continue with the current generic design of the UE<sub>x</sub> that could be tailored to function as an intermediate headquarters.<sup>104</sup> The use of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters may provide the needed expertise and personnel to eliminate this potential requirement.

The theater level headquarters, formally designated as the UE<sub>y</sub>, consolidates the functions and capability of the Corps and Army Service Component Commands into a single operational command.<sup>105</sup> This echelon of command has three concept designs that underline its organization.<sup>106</sup>

The first is concept is that this level headquarters is a regionally focused and globally networked organization that remains the senior Army headquarters in theater.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, it does not deploy from theater to theater but remains in its area of responsibility. The second concept design provides the command with enough capability to win the entry operation during the initial phase of a campaign and provides a platform for both Army and joint augmentation, possibly a Standing Joint Force Headquarters, if the crisis develops into a theater war.<sup>108</sup> The third design concept requires the headquarters to provide administrative control of Army forces

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Center, *Task Force Modularity: The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force*, TRAC-TR-05-13, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005), 45.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>105</sup> Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity*, Volume 1, Version 1.0, (Fort Monroe, VA, 2004), 1-7.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

and Army support to the entire joint, interagency, and multinational elements in the area of responsibility.<sup>109</sup>

In both times of peace and war, the theater headquarters performs many functions in support of the Combatant Commander as the Army Service Component Command. According to *The Comprehensive Guide to Modularity*, the theater command tailors land forces for joint operations, supports theater security cooperation plans, and provides theater-level augmentation to Army forces in the Joint Operations Area. In addition, it develops the mission-essential task list for conventional Army forces, provides training support, materials, and regional expertise to aligned Army forces.<sup>110</sup> This area overlaps with the regional expertise provided by the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The theater level headquarters supports Army forces deployed into theater and provides Army support, and appropriate command and control to focus the Army Forces (ARFOR) responsibilities in the Joint Operations Area.<sup>111</sup> In addition, it provides Army support to the joint, interagency, and multinational force as directed, organizes the deployment sequence and introduction of Army forces into theater, establishes and secures theater bases, and conducts reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.<sup>112</sup>

The theater operational level headquarters is organized functionally allowing for forward deployment of command and control while maintaining administrative control and support to forces throughout the entire theater.<sup>113</sup>

The functional alignment includes Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Operational Maneuver, Operational Fires and Effects, Operational Protection, Operational Sustainment and Force Projection, and Operational Command and Control as seen in Figure 11.

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
<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 4-2 - 4-3

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.



**Figure 11. Theater Level Operational Command Structure.<sup>114</sup>**

The theater level headquarters has the capability to become a Joint Task Force Headquarters provided with augmentation from a Standing Joint Force Headquarters or a joint manning document.<sup>115</sup> As mentioned earlier, the theater level operational headquarters may function as the Joint Force Land Component Command in theater war or major land operations.<sup>116</sup> This provides the advantage of using a regionally focused headquarters with a senior rank structure, but may degrade the ability of the headquarters to perform as a land component headquarters for another operation. Even if assigned as the Joint Task Force Headquarters, the headquarters retains its Army Service Component Command responsibilities and must continue its command and control function throughout the theater.<sup>117</sup>

The Army tactical warfighting headquarters, formally designated as UE<sub>x</sub>, combines the functions of the current Divisions with the tactical responsibilities of the current Corps.<sup>118</sup> This

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 4-3.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 4-18.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 4-17.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 4-18.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 1-10.



headquarters' primary function is to direct its assigned Brigade Combat Teams. In addition, resourcing allows it to operate as the Joint Land Force Component Command in small-scale contingencies and can operate as a Joint Task Force Headquarters with joint augmentation.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER SIX

### **DIFFERENCES IN SJFHQs AT REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS**

The requirement for each Regional Combatant Command to establish their own Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) produced variations to the Joint Forces Command version in order to meet the needs of their area of responsibility. This lack of standardization may impede the ease of integration with the Army Operational Headquarters. A description of the differences between combatant commands may provide an understanding of how these Standing Joint Force Headquarters will integrate with the new Army Operational Headquarters. A description of the SJFHQ established at European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) illustrate the differences between Combatant Commands.

A description of European Command's (EUCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters shows the first variation in design. EUCOM chose to meet the requirement of standing up a Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters through its' European Plans and Operations Center (EPOC). The European Plans and Operations Center was established in July 2003 replacing the previous Napoleonic J-code system. The European Plans and Operations Center claims to incorporate all the elements of the Joint Forces Command Standing Joint Force Headquarters with minor modifications to meet EUCOM's unique requirements.<sup>120</sup> The EPOC contains about 200 personnel, a sizeable increase from the JFCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters staff of 58 personnel. The increase is attributed to about half of the EPOC are assigned to the Joint Operations Center and the remainder were added as critical personnel as exercise planners,

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<sup>120</sup> Charles F. Wald, "U.S. European Command and Transformation," *Joint Force Quarterly* 37 (2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, 2005): 24.

information operations planners, interagency planners, and liaisons.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, the EUCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters is an integral part of the Combatant Command headquarters. EUCOM needed a command structure with the flexibility to operate from the tactical to strategic level and still be able to respond to the politico-military environment associated with NATO, the Global War on Terrorism, Stabilization Force, Kosovo Force, and other requirements within its area of responsibility.<sup>122</sup> The EPOC organization includes a Joint Operations Center, cross-functional planning teams focused on geographic or functional areas, knowledge management team, and an information superiority team.<sup>123</sup>

The ability to manage knowledge is the key to the success of the EPOC. Using the collaborative information environment, the Knowledge Management Team focuses on ensuring the right intelligence, planning, operations, and communications information is available to the right person, at the right time, in the right format to make informed decisions.<sup>124</sup>

The Plans Team comprises experienced members from across the EUCOM staff, ideally with at least a year experience in their staff function that provides the EPOC with the reach back capability to their staff sections for expertise.<sup>125</sup> It is organized along both short-range and long-range time horizons, corresponding up to 120 days and out to 2 years respectively.<sup>126</sup> An example of the flexibility to meet the mission requirements is the 2004 Summer Olympics, when the long-range planners transitioned to short-range planners and then supported the execution in the operations team to ensure consistency and seamless execution.<sup>127</sup>

EUCOM is incorporating the systems of systems analysis by its analysts to develop an operational net assessment for effects based planning. Analysis of nodes determines the best

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

means to influence an adversary's behavior through both military and non-military instruments.<sup>128</sup>

Although the name is different, the European Command's EPOC organization provides the capabilities outlined in the Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept developed by Joint Forces Command and meets the Secretary of Defense requirement. The EPOC enables EUCOM to be proactive rather than reactive by identifying potential crisis and conducting contingency planning earlier enough to prevent the escalation of a crisis.<sup>129</sup> Therefore, EUCOM established a sizeable increase in size to the Joint Forces Command prototype its functionality remains the same. The EUCOM example appears to incorporate the capabilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters throughout the J-3 section and not in a separate deployable element.

The second Standing Joint Force Command Headquarters we will discuss is Pacific Command (PACOM). The Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Pacific defines itself as a "starter kit" of trained and ready joint planners to support Joint and Coalition Task Force activation or augment the command and control of the Joint Task Force during contingency operations.<sup>130</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Pacific reports directly to the Deputy Commander of PACOM as a direct reporting unit under USPACOM.<sup>131</sup> SJFHQ-Pacific is the center of excellence for Joint and Combined planning, both deliberate and contingency, and effects-based planning, operations, and assessment.<sup>132</sup>

Figure 12 displays the Standing Joint Force Headquarters organizational structure at PACOM. The Information Superiority Group has five subdivisions to include Intelligence Support, Information Operations, Effects Assessment, Operational Net Assessment, and Systems

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>130</sup> Pacific Command, Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Pacific Brief MPAT TE-8, Mr. Cardinal, SJFHQ Chief of Staff, 19 July 2005, (Camp Smith, HI, 2005), Slide 7.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., Slide 8.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

Analysis. This Group provides the foundation for effects-based operations. Knowledge




Figure 12. SJFHQ-P Organizational Structure.<sup>133</sup>

Management Group provides the organization of information and ensures it is available through the collaborative information environment. The Green Group supports the PACOM focus area to support deliberate planning while the Blue Group supports contingency operations in support of service component ‘starter kit’ concept to Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, and Fleet.<sup>134</sup> In addition to subject matter experts, U.S. Multi-National Planning and Assistance Teams are incorporated as required.<sup>135</sup> In addition, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Pacific consists of a 25-40 personnel in the Joint Task Force Reserve Component Augmentee Element.<sup>136</sup> Therefore, PACOM’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters design allows for a responsive,

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., Slide 11.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., Slide 11.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

tailorable, and deployable element with expertise in planning and operations that can provide a jump-start to a JTF during any contingency.<sup>137</sup>

The third regional combatant command we will describe is Northern Command, NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM has designated its Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North as a separate directorate within the normal J-staff. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is composed of 64 personnel divided into four cross-functional teams. The teams include the Joint Operations Team, Joint Planning Team, Information Synchronization Team, and Joint Support Team.<sup>138</sup>

The Joint Operations Team is a 12-person team that provides coordination for the deployment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North in support of both crisis and exercises that require military response capability.<sup>139</sup> The Joint Operations Team focuses on directing, synchronizing, and assessing the desired effects of operational missions.<sup>140</sup> The Joint Operations Team provides expertise in Air, Land, Maritime and Space operations capabilities in addition to Special Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Force Protection and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) capabilities.<sup>141</sup> The Joint Operations Team gains and maintains situational awareness and understanding and integrates other Department of Defense Agencies, National Guard Bureau, and other interagency organizations to include the Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., Slide 12.

<sup>138</sup> Northern Command, *Standing Joint Force Headquarters North Concept of Operations, Version 9* (Colorado Springs, CO, 2004), 6-7.

<sup>139</sup> Northern Command, *Standing Joint Force Headquarters North Concept of Operations, Draft 21 Nov* (Colorado Springs, CO, 2005), 1-14,1-60.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 1-60.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 1-14.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 1-61.

The Joint Planning Team is a 12-person team that supports contingency and crisis action planning and focuses on the effects portion of the operational net assessment.<sup>143</sup> The Joint Planning Team is the lead in plans involving homeland defense and homeland security and coordinates with local, state, tribal, and other federal agencies.<sup>144</sup>

The Information Synchronization Team conducts the pre-crisis system of systems analysis in the Combatant Commander's focused areas to develop a situational understanding of the area prior to a given crisis.<sup>145</sup> The Information Synchronization Team consists of a 28-person team divided into five branches consisting of System of Systems Analysis, Intelligence, Information Operations, Knowledge Management, and Communications.<sup>146</sup> The Information Synchronization Team focuses on the information environment, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information to ensure support of the other cross-functional team efforts.<sup>147</sup>

The Joint Support Team is an 8-person team that provides both internal support to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North and external support to assigned forces as augmentation to a Joint Task Force.<sup>148</sup> The Joint Support Team provides the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and Joint Task Force with expertise reach back in the areas of support.<sup>149</sup> These areas include medical operations and planning, civil and military engineering operations and planning, operational law planning, public affairs operations and planning, logistics operations and planning, movement planning and execution, budget tracking and planning, personnel planning and limited services, and reach back contracting capability.<sup>150</sup>

An additional asset available to the commander is the NORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team. The NORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team is a 4-man team that due to its

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 1-57, 1-13.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 1-57.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 1-52.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 1-14, 1-52.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 1-14, 1-52.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 1-15.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 1-65.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 1-65.

rapidly deployable, self-sufficiency and organic communications can serve as a forward element for a Joint Task Force.<sup>151</sup> This team provides situational awareness and connectivity during emerging crisis response and consequence management. The NORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team provides the commander and staff with critical information, from the scene, that assists in the planning process.<sup>152</sup> This initial assessment will aid the planning staff in determining valid military missions, providing situational understanding, and aiding in the determination of military capabilities needed for the situation.<sup>153</sup>

Although the Regional Combatant Commands have established a Standing Joint Force Headquarters, each command developed a unique variation to meet the Secretary of Defense's requirement. This lack of standardization across the Regional Combatant Commands presents a complex problem to their integration into the Army Operational Headquarters.

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 1-24.

<sup>152</sup> Northern Command, *Standing Joint Force Headquarters North Concept of Operations, Version 9* (Colorado Springs, CO, 2004), 32.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 35.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### **CAPABILITIES/VULNERABILITIES OF THE SJFHQ**

As discussed in previous chapters, Joint Forces Command developed a prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters model that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002. It provided essential pre-crisis planning and a focused operational net assessment to the Joint Task Force Headquarters including the development of the contingency plan for the exercise.<sup>154</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provided planning augmentation, regional situational awareness and understanding, experience with collaborative tools, and joint operations experience to the Joint Task Force Headquarters.<sup>155</sup> Millennium Challenge 2002 participants concluded that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provided command and control support to the Joint Task Force Headquarters, reduced the “ad hoc” nature, reduced the steep learning curve, and facilitated continuity through pre-crisis, execution and transition.<sup>156</sup> These criteria prompted the Secretary of Defense to initiate the concept in each of the Regional Combatant Commands.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings the Joint Task Force Headquarters many capabilities that augment the Army Operational Headquarters when forming a Joint Task Force Headquarters. However, it must overcome certain vulnerabilities that limit its ability to integrate successfully with the Army Operational Headquarters and become a planning multiplier. An analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities associated with this integration will provide insight into how to improve the Standing joint Force Headquarters concept.

The definitions of capabilities and vulnerabilities presented earlier in this paper provide the tools necessary to analyze the benefits of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Applying the definition in the final draft of the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 3010.02B,

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<sup>154</sup> Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3. Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, (Norfolk, VA., 2003), 3.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

we will define a capability as the ways and means, to include personnel, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides a planning multiplier to the Army Operational Headquarters giving it the ability to establish a Joint Task Force Headquarters. In contrast, a vulnerability is defined as a characteristic of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters that may impede or degrade its ability to provide a planning multiplier when integrated with the Army Operational Headquarters. With this understanding of the definitions, an analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters can be conducted to determine how they provide planning multipliers to the Army Operational Headquarters.

In previous chapters, a discussion of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters established at EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM provided an awareness of their organizational structures. This chapter identifies the capabilities that are similar in all of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to include the JFCOM prototype. Then, a comparison of the differences between the Regional Combatant Command's Standing Joint Force Headquarters is conducted to determine the vulnerabilities of successful integration with the Army Operational Headquarters. The final chapter provides recommendations to alleviate these vulnerabilities.

First, all of the analyzed Standing Joint Force Headquarters bring joint operations experience as demonstrated in Millennium Challenge 2002. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides the Joint Task Force Headquarters with Joint qualified personnel with experience and training in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This assists the Army Operational Headquarters with the planning and execution procedures used in the joint environment.

Many of the soldiers assigned to the Army Operational Headquarters staff may have limited experience or understanding of Joint doctrine, JOPES, JSPS, or the capabilities of the other services. Personnel assigned to Division and Corps headquarters staffs may have spent most of their careers at the tactical level working only with other Army personnel with little contact and interaction with the other services. This may have led them to have an Army or land-

centric understanding of the operating environment and the available courses of action to solve a problem. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters can provide the Army Operational Headquarters with the needed depth of knowledge and understanding of Joint Doctrine and service component capabilities therefore bridging this gap. Joint Publication 1-02 defines joint doctrine as the following:

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.<sup>157</sup>

This common understanding of terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures allows the staff to work both more efficiently and effectively within the headquarters. It ensures that the Joint Task Force Headquarters speaks the same language as the higher headquarters and its subordinate units. The services can understand and interpret the Joint Task Force commander's intent into their services unique terminology allowing for clear communication of the mission. This common language, through a common understanding of Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and terminology, provides the headquarters staff with both a planning and execution multiplier for the Joint Task Force Command.

This experience helps to ensure compliance with Joint doctrine when developing plans. According to Joint Publication 5-0, Joint operation plans should be consistent with Joint Doctrine and developed in conformance with the joint criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.<sup>158</sup> As the Standing Joint Force Headquarters' personnel integrate into the Army Operational Headquarters staff they can assist in applying Joint doctrine both during the planning process and during the production of the order. Therefore, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides the joint doctrine expertise to ensure that plans are consistent with Joint doctrine and in turn provides a planning multiplier to the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

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<sup>157</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001, 2005), 283.

<sup>158</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), I-13.

In addition, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is comprised of personnel from the sister services and interagency subject matter experts that bring an understanding of their services and agency's capabilities and doctrine. This provides the integrated Joint Task Force Headquarters with service specific subject matter experts that can aid in the planning and utilization of the total joint force. Therefore, it allows them to capitalize on the unique capabilities inherent in each of the services. The addition of sister service personnel allows the Joint Task Force commander and staff to view the solution to the problem or crisis through an additional lens reducing the tendency of the planners to see the world only through their single service viewpoint. This helps to ensure that the available service and interagency capabilities are incorporated into the Joint Task Force plans and orders during development and not as an afterthought. The subject matter experts from the sister service and interagency provide the Army Operational Headquarters with a planning multiplier in the contemporary operating environment.

Second, all of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters bring regional situational awareness and understanding to the Joint Task Force Headquarters through a systems perspective of the operational environment through the development of a baseline operational net assessment. During peacetime, the Regional Combatant Commander directs the Standing Joint Force Headquarters' efforts toward focus areas within his area of responsibility. By maintaining a day-to-day awareness and understanding of the region during peacetime, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings both regional expertise and understanding of the operational area to the Joint Task Force Headquarters when it arrives. Before the receipt of the mission, the Army Operational Headquarters may have little knowledge of the region they are to operate. Prior to the crisis, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters develops the operational net assessment for the region assisting the Army Operational Headquarters staff with the ability to rapidly be spun up on the intricacies of the region and begin detailed planning sooner. This helps prevent the requirement of the staff to begin researching the environment and area of responsibility from the

ground up or starting planning without good situational awareness prior to the start of detailed planning. Therefore, it reduces the steep learning curve usually found in an ad hoc headquarters organization. This is a critical to beginning detailed planning quickly with a much-needed understanding of how the various systems within the region relate to one another.

Through the operational net assessment and their regional focus, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides a more inclusive understanding of the environment the Joint Task Force Headquarters is to operate. The operational environment includes not only the military forces and capabilities but also the air, land, sea, space and the associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that can influence the operation.<sup>159</sup> The definition of a system is a functionally related group of elements that interact together forming a complex whole.<sup>160</sup> The development of the operational net assessment is through a system of systems analysis of the operational environment that looks much deeper than the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. A system of systems analysis identifies nodes and linkages between systems that may be exploited to achieve the desired effects. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters focuses on developing a baseline operational net assessment during peacetime and does not wait until a potential crisis to begin situational awareness and understanding. This provides the new Joint Task Force Headquarters with an advantage over the rushed mission analysis and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace during the traditional “ad hoc” Joint Task Force organization. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters can provide the information in the baseline operational net assessment to the Army Operational Headquarters increasing their knowledge of the crisis and region of their area of operation. This provides the operational headquarters with an increased awareness of the current and possible future situation.

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<sup>159</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Revision Third Draft* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), IV-8.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

Through the awareness of the adversary's critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities, this systems perspective will aid in determination of how best to influence the center of gravity and decisive points either by a direct or indirect approach.

Joint Publication 5-0 defines the centers of gravity as the characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.<sup>161</sup> A complete systems of systems analysis assists in the determination of the possible center of gravity of the adversary. This analysis will aid in determining the decisive points that may be influenced either by kinetic or non-kinetic means to resolve or diffuse the crisis. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters can be a critical enabler to the Joint Task Force Headquarters if they have begun the analysis prior to the crisis. This analysis is also critical when using the traditional effects based approach by determining the required nodes and linkages to determine how to create the desired effect to resolve the problem.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters' operational net assessment provides the Army Operational Headquarters and the Joint Task Force Commander with a valuable tool to aid in the operational art. Through its systems of systems analysis and development of the linkages between nodes within the systems, the planning staff can anticipate the effects of their actions. Joint Publication 3-0 states that anticipation is critical to effective planning.<sup>162</sup> It anticipates not only the adversary's reaction but also the reaction of other regional players and systems. Therefore, it provides situational awareness of the entire operational environment and not just the known adversary. According to Joint Publication 3-0, situational awareness is a prerequisite for planners to anticipate opportunities and challenges.<sup>163</sup> Therefore, the integration of the Standing

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<sup>161</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), GL-4.

<sup>162</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), III-12

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, III-13

Joint Force Headquarters into the Army Operational Headquarters provides a planning multiplier through its detailed operational net assessment and system of systems analysis.

Third, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides experience with collaborative tools. As discussed earlier, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provide assets that ensure the common operational picture and other knowledge management tools are available to the right user in the right format. This capability augments those capabilities found within the Army Operational Headquarters providing a more robust planning capability to the Joint Task Force Headquarters. The Jointness of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, personnel from all services resident within the element, permits a smoother flow of information between the headquarters and subordinate units and an understanding of the systems used within each of the services. Breaking down barriers to effective planning provides another planning multiplier provided by the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

Although the Standing Joint Force Headquarters can augment gaps to Joint Operations, it must also be aware of the vulnerabilities to the successful integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters into the Army Operational Headquarters. Recommendations to improve the JFCOM prototype are identified by comparing the differences between the Standing Joint Force Headquarters established by the Regional Combatant Commands.

The first major difference found between the Regional Combatant Commands is the establishment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as a separate directorate that can deploy as a stand alone element. As discussed earlier, EUCOM dispersed the capabilities and personnel of their Standing Joint Force Headquarters throughout the EPOC. Although EUCOM has increased the number of personnel assigned to the EPOC, half of its personnel are assigned to the Joint Operations Center. These personnel are an integral part of the planning and operations of the EUCOM staff and may reduce the capability of the Combatant Command if deployed to augment a Joint Task Force Headquarters. This may reduce its capability to operate as a separate deployable unit in times of crises. In addition, this does not meet JFCOM's intent that the

members of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters be located together during peacetime and not dispersed through the Regional Combatant Command staff.<sup>164</sup> In contrast, PACOM and NORTHCOM designed their Standing Joint Force Headquarters as separate directorates. As distinct direct reporting elements, their transition and employment does not significantly reduce the capability of the combatant command by requiring individual J-staffs to provide personnel. This separate element has worked together in peacetime and has developed into a cohesive unit prior to integration with the Army Operational Headquarters reducing the additional tensions and “ad hoc” nature of forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters. This supports JFCOM’s intent for the establishment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters exemplified in Millennium Challenge. The Army Operational Headquarters has the potential for deployment around the globe to provide a response to a crisis. The differences in design reduce the efficiency of the integration of the transformed Army and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The differences in design require the Army Operational Headquarters to adjust standard operating procedures each time they deploy into a different theater. Forcing the Army Operational Headquarters to adjust to each Standing Joint Force Headquarters design may create the ad hoc nature it was intended to eliminate. Therefore, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters should be a separate directorate within the Combatant Commander’s staff to allow for uninterrupted employment with the Army Operational Headquarters.

The second difference is the organizational structure of the various Standing Joint Force Headquarters. As described in Chapter 3, JFCOM’s prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters includes six functional administrative groups that provide and receive personnel to establish the four cross-functional teams that can be tailored to each crisis. These teams focus on plans, operations, information superiority, and knowledge management. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters established at the combatant commands have teams that provide many of the same

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 7.



capabilities described in JFCOM's prototype, but have altered the structure to meet the needs of their region. This may lead to confusion when integrated with the Army Operational Headquarters. The EPOC developed by EUCOM retains the functional team names found in the JFCOM's prototype, but is not a separate element but dispersed throughout the headquarters. PACOM follows the JFCOM model with only a few exceptions. PACOM retains the four cross-functional teams, but separates deliberate planning from contingency operations supporting service components between the Green and Blue Groups. The Blue Group appears to be the primary interface with the Army Operational Headquarters in forming a Joint Task Force Headquarters for contingency planning. NORTHCOM retains the functions of operations and plans similar to the JFCOM model, but the Information Synchronization Team combines the roles and responsibilities found in JFCOM's Information Superiority and Knowledge Management Teams. This combination ensures one team controls and "synchronizes" the information, intelligence, and knowledge entering the headquarters to eliminate redundancy and misinformation. This meets JFCOM's intent for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to provide planning augmentation, regional situational awareness and understanding, and experience with collaborative tools. Although the Standing Joint Force Headquarters develops a baseline operational net assessment for the designated focus areas, it must continue to refine and update it to be useful to the Joint Task Force Headquarters. The operational net assessment must be a living document and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters must understand that the world is dynamic and must be more than a snapshot in time. This requires constant updates to the collaborative tools to ensure the planners have the most recent information. The collaborative information environment remains useful only if the updated information is available and provided to the planners. The information cannot just be entered into a database for them to search, but it must be readily available to the user. Therefore, NORTHCOM's Information Synchronization Team provides a single source for de-confliction throughout the headquarters providing "synchronized" awareness and understanding through the collaborative information environment.

Therefore, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides the Army Operational Headquarters with capabilities that enhance its ability to function as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. It brings joint operations experience to the Army Operational Headquarters when integrated into the headquarters to form a Joint Task Force Headquarters. This allows for an integrated and synchronized plan using all available resources in the best way possible to diffuse or solve the crisis confronting the Joint Task Force Headquarters. In addition, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings a systems perspective to the planning process and provides a detailed baseline operational net assessment, developed during peacetime that provides a jump-start to the planning process of the Joint Task Force Headquarters. This reduces the learning curve and facilitates continuity throughout the entire operation as demonstrated in Millennium Challenge 2002. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters ensures collaboration through joint knowledge management and the common operational picture utilizing the collaborative information environment.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper examined the historical events and policy that led to the requirement by the Secretary of Defense for each Regional Combatant Command to establish a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Then, a description of the model presented by Joint Forces Command for the organization and responsibilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters was discussed. Along with its structure, an examination of the methods of employment the Standing Joint Force Headquarters could use to respond to crises throughout the world. This paper focused on the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters into an existing headquarters, the Army Operational Headquarters. In addition, it outlined the organizational structure of the newly transformed Army Operational Headquarters. Next, the similarities and differences between the Standing Joint Force Headquarters found at the different Regional Combatant Commands were analyzed. This led to an analysis of the capabilities the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings to the Joint Task Force Headquarters in support of the Army Operational Headquarters. Therefore, the conclusion that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters contains capabilities that are beneficial to the establishment of a Joint Task Force Headquarters was derived. The joint experience and regional expertise brought by the Standing Joint Force Headquarters allows for a more rapid establishment of a cohesive and functioning Joint Task Force Headquarters.

However, within the analysis some vulnerabilities to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters became apparent that may impede its ability to act as a planning multiplier. The following recommendations are proposed to reduce the effects of these vulnerabilities in the employment of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters ensuring that it remains a planning multiplier to the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

First, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters should be a separate deployable element that is standardized across the Regional Combatant Commands in order to allow a smooth transition

when integrating with operational headquarters. This will alleviate the vulnerability associated with the differences in designs of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters discussed in the last chapter. Although each Regional Combatant Command has structured their Standing Joint Force Headquarters to meet their individual requirements and desires, it is important to ensure that, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is able to integrate with the Army Operational Headquarters, or other service headquarters, with relative ease. Standardization allows the operational headquarters to plan and develop standard operating procedures for integrating the planning multiplier of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters therefore rapidly establishing a joint capable headquarters. This in itself will help alleviate the “ad hoc” nature of the historical Joint Task Force Headquarters. Standardization as a separate directorate allows the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to integrate with other operational headquarters meeting the intent of Department of Defense transformation guidance.

In order to standardize the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, there is a requirement for proper resourcing of the Regional Combatant Commands to both staff and fund this planning multiplier. This will require JFCOM to develop the joint equivalent to a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) or a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to ensure the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is not an “out of hide” or additional duty requirement that meets the needs of all Regional Combatant Commands. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters should be manned with full-time personnel in order to provide the products and meet the intent of the JFCOM model. Standardization and manning will allow for an easier transition and integration with the Army Operational Headquarters during a time of crisis.

The second recommendation is the establishment of a single team for information synchronization. This team synchronizes intelligence, operational net assessment, knowledge management, and communications all under one team. NORTHCOM’s Information Synchronization Team provides the example for a single entity for de-confliction of information

and provides the needed situational awareness and understanding through the collaborative information environment.

In conclusion, there are additional recommendations for improvement to the integration of joint headquarters and understanding of joint operations. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters must be included in the Joint Exercise Management Plan to ensure cyclical rotation and training with operational headquarters. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the Army Operational Headquarters should build both a working relationship with one another and an understanding of the joint environment. This will reduce the vulnerability of bringing in an unknown outside organization, the SJFHQ, and the friction associated with this integration. This can be accomplished through Joint exercises and training. Joint exercises and training provide the members of each staff with an appreciation of the benefits of the combined effort and the capabilities that each brings to the Joint Task Force Headquarters. This working relationship will assist in reducing the barriers to trust and understanding between the personnel of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the Army Operational Headquarters allowing for the rapid establishment of a cohesive Joint Task Force Headquarters.

Joint education and training is crucial for the acceptance of the outside organization, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, into the established Army Operational Headquarters. Integration of two units is difficult and a common understanding of the benefits that each element brings to the Joint Task Force Headquarters is the key to successful the integration of the organizations.

Also, the U.S. Army should continue to develop its officers with an awareness and understanding of joint capabilities and limitations. This will provide future benefits when integrating with the Standing Joint Force Headquarters or when a SJFHQ is not available because it is engaged in another region in support of a crisis. An emphasis on gaining experience with our sister services through joint training and exercises are ways to develop and encourage this understanding. Joint professional military education should be viewed as an opportunity for

development rather than a requirement. Army Officers should take advantage of education provided at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and obtain both the 3H, Joint Planner, and 6Z, Strategist, additional skill identifiers to develop greater situational awareness of the joint environment as well as a global understanding.

The services should continue to sending their personnel to sister service schools as both liaisons and to develop officers with an appreciation of what the other service provide in the joint fight. The Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies and Special Operations Forces tracks at Fort Leavenworth provide the Army officer attending the Army Staff College with a unique opportunity to work on a staff were he is not the predominate service. This provides him with a greater joint appreciation.

The Army should continue and expand its exercise programs with the equivalent military education level schools to broaden our officer's perspectives and prepare them to work in the joint environment. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) has set the example for joint understanding through its exercise programs and opportunities. Students develop and understanding of the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) providing the students with an opportunity to learn the Marine Corps Planning Process with oversight and mentorship from prior Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commanders. Students participate in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), the Air Force equivalent to SAMS, exercise at Maxwell AFB. This gives students from both schools the opportunity to function in a joint staff within a training environment developing friendships and understanding and awareness of the sister service capabilities and limitations. The service should continue developing joint exercises between the schoolhouses and expand them to include all students attending the schools.

Resources, both time and funding, are required to conduct these exercises and training. Joint sponsored exercises, like Ulchi Focus Lens in Korea, provide excellent opportunities for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to integrate with the Army Operational Headquarters to build this working relationship with one another and develop Joint experience.

Although not all Regional Combatant Commands are currently meeting JFCOM's vision, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters still provides a planning multiplier to the Joint Task Force Headquarters through the capabilities that are inherent in its structure. By following the JFCOM model and applying the recommendations in this paper, integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters with the Army Operational Headquarters will continue to improve and reach the intent of JFCOM and the Secretary of Defense.

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